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Abstract—A combined base station association and power con-
trol problem is studied for the uplink of multichannel multicell
cellular networks, in which each channel is used by exactly
one cell (i.e., base station). A distributed association and power
update algorithm is proposed and shown to converge to a Nash
equilibrium of a noncooperative game. We consider network
models with discrete mobiles (yielding an atomic congestion
game), as well as a continuum of mobiles (yielding a population
game). We find that the equilibria need not be Pareto efficient,
nor need they be system optimal. To address the lack of system
optimality, we propose pricing mechanisms. It is shown that these
mechanisms can be implemented in a distributed fashion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication systems have experienced tremen-
dous growth over the last decade, and this growth continues
unabated worldwide. Efficient management of resources is
essential for the success of wireless cellular systems. In a
mobile cellular system, mobiles adapt to time varying radio
channels by adjusting base station (BS) associations and
by controlling transmitter powers. Doing so, they not only
maintain their quality of service (QoS) but also enhance their
transmitters’ battery lives. In addition, such controls reduce the
network interference, thus maximizing spatial spectrum reuse.
Distributed control is of special interest, since the alternative
of centrally orchestrated control involves added infrastructure,
the need for distribution of measurements, and hence system
complexity.
Distributed control algorithms for single channel multicell
networks have been extensively studied (Foschini & Mil-
janic [1], Yates [2], Hanly [3]). The monograph by Chiang
et al. [4] and references therein provide an excellent survey
of the area. Noncooperative games have been a natural tool
for analysis and design of distributed power control algo-
rithms. Scutari et al. [5] and Heikkinen [6] model distributed
power control problems as potential games, while Altman &
Altman [7] show that many of the cellular power control
algorithms can be modeled as submodular games. In contrast,
uplink resource allocation for multichannel multicell networks
poses several challenges as observed in Yates [2] and Jiang
et al. [8].
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We address the resource allocation problem in the uplink
of a multichannel multicell network with a single traffic class.
Such a problem arises when a CDMA operator chooses to
lease and utilize multiple frequency bands in order to reduce
in-network interference, or multiple operators who lease differ-
ent bands decide to cooperate. The newer mobile devices are
typically radio agile, and thus have the option to choose from
one of these distinct bands. We address a simplified version
of this multichannel multicell problem where all BSs operate
on different frequency bands.
A preview of our results is as follows. We propose a
distributed algorithm for the combined base station association
and power control problem, and subsequently model the
problem as a player-specific congestion game. The equilibrium
states of such algorithms, which are Nash equilibria of the
corresponding games, may be far from system optimum. We
resort to pricing mechanisms to induce mobiles to behave in
a way that optimizes system cost. We also show that such a
mechanism can be employed in a distributed fashion. Towards
this end, we model the network as having a continuum
of (nonatomic) mobiles, each offering infinitesimal load, which
leads to a population game formulation. We then provide a
marginal pricing mechanism that motivates a pricing strategy
for the discrete mobiles case. Note that, unlike the case
of transportation networks, mobiles are not really priced in
cellular networks. The pricing is simply a part of the decision
making routine built into each mobile in order bring about a
distributed control mechanism that drives the system toward
optimality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly
discuss concepts of finite noncooperative games and popula-
tion games. We study a network model with discrete mobiles
in Section III. We propose a combined association and power
control algorithm, model it as a noncooperative game, and
analyze its performance. We extend this analysis to a network
with a continuum of mobiles in Section IV. To address
the inefficiency of the proposed algorithms, we design toll
mechanisms in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper with
some remarks in Section VI.
Optimal power allocation and BS association in uplinks
of multichannel multicell cellular networks have not been
explored before. Ours is an attempt at a detailed coverage
on what is possible in general, with more specific results in
some special cases.
2II. GAME PRELIMINARIES
A. Finite Noncooperative Games
A noncooperative strategic form game (M, (Ai, i ∈
M), (ci, i ∈ M)) consists of a set of players M =
{1, . . . ,M}. Each player i is accompanied by an action
set Ai and a cost function ci : ×Mi=1Ai → R. In this
work, we assume all action sets to be finite. An action
profile a = (ai, i = 1, . . . ,M) prescribes an action ai
for every player i ∈ M. For a = (ai, i = 1, . . . ,M),
denote a−i := (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aM ) and (bi, a−i) :=
(a1, . . . , ai−1, bi, ai+1, . . . , aM ).
Definition 2.1: Nash Equilibrium (NE): For an action pro-
file a, a mobile i’s best response, Bi(a) ⊆ Ai, is defined
as Bi(a) := argminbi∈Ai ci(bi, a−i). a is said to be a Nash
Equilibrium for the game if ai ∈ Bi(a) for all i ∈M.
Definition 2.2: Potential Game: A game (M, (Ai, i ∈
M), (ci, i ∈ M)) is said to be an ordinal potential game if
there exists a function V : ×Mi=1Ai → R, known as an ordinal
potential function, that satisfies
ci(bi, a−i) < ci(a)⇔ V (bi, a−i) < V (a)
for all i ∈M, bi ∈ Ai, a ∈ ×Mi=1Ai.
Clearly, all minimizers of an ordinal potential function V
are Nash equilibria of the game. Thus all ordinal potential
games (M, (Ai, i ∈ M), (ci, i ∈M)) admit at least one Nash
equilibrium. On account of their finiteness they also have the
finite improvement path (FIP) property, i.e., do not contain
improvement cycles (Monderer & Shapley [9, Lemma 2.3]).
Thus, in a finite ordinal potential game when players update
as per the better response strategy, round-robin or random
update processes converge to a Nash equilibrium in a finite
number of steps. With the same strategies, an asynchronous
update process also converges (Neel [10, Chapter 5]).
Remark 2.1: The strategic form games that have the FIP
property also admit the finite best-response path (FBRP) prop-
erty, i.e., do not contain best response cycles (Milchtaich [11,
Section 5]).1 Thus, if players update as per the best response
strategy, then also the above update processes converge to
a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The reverse
implication is not true in general - FBRP need not imply FIP.
Definition 2.3: Congestion Game: A game (M, (Ai, i ∈
M), (ci, i ∈ M)) is said to be a player-specific weighted
singleton congestion game if
1) there exists a set N such that Ai = N for all i ∈ M,
and
2) there exist constants (βi, i ∈ M) and nonincreasing
functions fij , i ∈M, j ∈ N such that
ci(a) = fiai(
∑
l∈M:
al=ai
βl) for all a ∈ ×Mi=1Ai, i ∈ M.
In the above definition, we interpretN as a set of facilities and
βl as the load offered by player i. Then,
∑
l∈M:
al=ai
βl denotes the
total load on facility ai, under an action profile a. The game is
1A best response cycle is a finite best response path a1, · · · , ak such that
a
1 = ak, and for some j ∈ {1, · · · , k−1}, the deviating player in iteration
j strictly benefits[12].
a singleton congestion game because each action picks exactly
one facility. It is weighted because players offer different loads,
and it is player-specific because the cost functions ci(·) are
player-specific.
Rosenthal [13] has defined congestion games with un-
weighted players and player-independent cost functions, but
more general action sets. The above generalization is due to
Milchtaich [11] who also showed that singleton congestion
games with weighted players but player independent costs
admit FIP. Gairing et al. [14] studied these games in the
special case of linear cost functions. Georgiou et al. [15]
introduced a routing game where the players only have incom-
plete information about edge latencies, and showed that this
game can be transformed into a (complete information) player
specific singleton congestion game with linear cost functions.
Mavronicolas et al. [16] considered a subclass where each
player-specific cost function is composed (by means of an
abelian group operation) of a player-specific constant and a
facility-specific nondecreasing function.
B. Population Games
A population game (Sandholm [17]) (M, (Al, l ∈
L), (clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ Al)) consists of L = {1, . . . , L} classes
of nonatomic populations of players. M = ∪l∈LMl, and
Ml := |Ml| denotes the total mass of the class l population.
By a nonatomic population, we mean that the mass of each
member of the population is infinitesimal. Players of class l
are associated with an action set Al. Actions of these (class
l) players lead to an action distribution ml = (mlj , j ∈ Al),
where
∑
j∈Al mlj = Ml. All the players within a class are
alike. Thus the action distributions completely specify the
play; we can characterize the states and dynamics of play
solely in terms of action distributions. Let m = (ml, l ∈ L)
denote the action distribution profile across the entire pop-
ulation, and let M∗ denote the set of all such profiles. A
population l is also accompanied by continuous cost density
functions clj :M∗ → R.
Definition 2.4: Nash Equilibrium (NE): An action distribu-
tion profile m is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the
game (M, (Ai, i ∈ M), (clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ (Al)) if and only if
for all l ∈ L and j ∈ Al, a positive mass mlj > 0 implies
clj(m) ≤ clk(m) for all k ∈ Al.
Remark 2.2: At a Nash equilibrium m, for a class l, if j
and k are any two facilities in Al such that mlj > 0,mlk > 0,
then clj(m) = clk(m).
Definition 2.5: Potential Game: A game (M, (Al, l ∈
L), (clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ Al)) is said to be a potential game if there
exists a C1 function V : M∗ → R, known as a potential
function, that satisfies
∂V (m)
∂mlj
= clj(m)
for all l ∈ L, j ∈ Al,m ∈ M∗.
It is well known that Nash equilibria are the profiles which
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a minimizer
of the potential function (Sandholm [17, Proposition 3.1]). Any
dynamics with positive correlation and noncomplacency (in
3particular the best response dynamics) approaches a Nash
equilibrium [17].
We are interested in nonatomic congestion games (Sand-
holm [17]), in which Al = N , ∀l ∈ L, for a given set N .
As before, we interpret N as a set of facilities. Moreover,
each class l has an associated offered load density γl > 0.
An action distribution profile m leads to a congestion profile
(mj , j ∈ N ), where mj =
∑
l∈Lmljγl. The cost density
functions clj depend on m only through mj , and are increasing
in mj .
C. Pricing
Levying of tolls is a conventional way to enforce system
optimality in nonatomic networks. Beckman [18] and Dafer-
mos & Sparrow [19] studied optimal tolls in transportation
networks with a single class of users. Later Dafermos [20]
and Smith [21] extended the analysis to multiclass networks.
Roughgarden & Tardos [22] applied these ideas in computer
networks and analyzed tolls for optimal routing.
In the atomic (discrete) setting, Caragiannis et al. [23]
proposed tolls for two-terminal parallel-edge networks with
unweighted users and linear latency functions. Fotakis &
Spirakis [24] extended these to generic two-terminal net-
works with unweighted users and arbitrary increasing latency
functions. We propose an alternative toll mechanism, and
demonstrate that the proposed tolls can be computed in a
distributed fashion.
III. DISCRETE MOBILES
A. System Model
We now describe the model adopted in this work. We
consider the uplink of a cellular network consisting of several
BSs and mobiles. Each BS operates in a distinct frequency
band. Let N = {1, . . . , N} and M = {1, . . . ,M} denote the
set of BSs and the set of mobiles, respectively.
A mobile must be associated with one BS at any time, and
is free to choose the BS with which it associates. Let hij
denote the power gain from mobile i to BS j. Let the receiver
noise at all BSs have the average power σ2. Let pi denote the
power transmitted by mobile i, and let ai be the BS to which
it is associated. Under an association profile a = (ai, i =
1, . . . ,M), let Mj(a) be the set of mobiles associated with
BS j. Under an association profile a = (ai, i = 1, . . . ,M)
and a power vector p = (pi, i = 1, . . . ,M), the signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of mobile i at BS ai is
hiaipi∑
l∈Mai (a)\{i} hlalpl + σ
2
Mobile i has a target SINR requirement γi.
B. The Proposed Algorithm
Yates [2] and Hanly [3] proposed an algorithm for dis-
tributed association and power control in single channel cel-
lular networks. Convergence results for the algorithm are
based on the concept of a standard interference function. The
technique is based on a mobile reassociating itself with a
BS with which it needs to use the least power; this fails to
work in the case of a multichannel network and analogous
convergence results for this algorithm may not hold (see
Yates [2, Section VI]). Even in instances where the algorithm
converges, it may get stuck at a power allocation that is not
Pareto efficient.
We propose an alternative distributed algorithm for com-
bined BS association and power control in multichannel mul-
ticell cellular networks. We also show its convergence. We
make use of the following simple fact (see, for example,
Kumar et al. [25, Chapter 5]). Consider the subproblem of
power control with a fixed association a. Define βl = γl1+γl , a
measure of the “load” offered by mobile l.
Proposition 3.1: For a fixed association a,
(i) The power control subproblem of BS j is feasible iff∑
l∈Mj(a) βl < 1.(ii) If the power control subproblem of BS j is feasible, there
exists a unique Pareto efficient power vector p(a) given by
pi(a) =
σ2
hij
βi
1−∑l∈Mj(a) βl .
Throughout we assume that there exists at least one feasible
association and power vector. Proposition 3.1 motivates the
following algorithm.
Multichannel Association and Power Control (MAPC):
Mobiles switch associations in a round-robin fashion by taking
into account the optimal power consumptions (given by Propo-
sition 3.1(ii)) at the BSs with which these associate. This is
done as follows. As the load at a BS changes, it immediately
broadcasts the new load, and associated mobiles update their
powers to the optimal required powers as per the new loads.
To be more precise, define
ci(a) =
σ2
hiai
β
[1−∑l∈Mj(a) βl]+ , (1)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0). For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , mobile i where
i = 1+(t mod M) updates its association and power at t+1
if ai(t) /∈ argminj∈N ci((j, a(t)−i)). In this case,
ai(t+ 1) ∈ argmin
j∈N
ci((j, a(t)−i)), (2a)
and with a(t + 1) = (ai(t+ 1), a(t)−i),
pl(t+ 1) = cl(a(t+ 1)),
∀l ∈Mai(t)(a(t)) ∪Mai(t+1)(a(t + 1)). (2b)
Remark 3.1: A mobile i should not choose a BS if the
device renders the corresponding power control subproblem
infeasible. The situation is characterized by
∑
l∈Mj(a) βl ≥ 1,
and (1) appropriately yields infinite cost for the mobile. Even
if the algorithm starts with an infeasible association, selfish
moves of players eventually lead to a feasible one, and updates
remain feasible thereafter.
Note that while only one mobile updates its association
at a time, all mobiles that perceive a change in load at
their BSs update their powers to optimal values based on the
new loads. Simultaneous association updates are not allowed.
In a framework with no synchronizing agent and with an
4arbitrarily fine time-scale, it is unlikely that two mobiles
update simultaneously. If two or more BSs result in the same
steady state power, one is chosen at random by the mobile.
This algorithm is also distributed in nature as the one
proposed in Yates [2]. BS j broadcasts its total congestion∑
l∈Mj(a) βl. In addition, each mobile i is told its scaled gains
hij
σ2
by each BS j ∈ N .
C. A Congestion Game Formulation
To show the convergence properties of the proposed algo-
rithm, we model the system as a strategic form game. Let the
mobiles be the players and the action set for each player be
the possible associations, i.e, Ai = N for all i ∈ M. Define
the cost functions of the players to be ci(a) for all i ∈ M. It
can be seen that above is a player-specific singleton weighted
congestion game, and belongs to the subclass of congestion
games with multiplicative player-specific constants described
in [16]. In the following we refer to it as the strategic form
game (M,N , (ci, i ∈M)).
Before analyzing the general game, we consider the follow-
ing special cases.
1) Single Class Traffic: This is the case where all the mo-
biles have a common target SINR requirement γ; β := γ1+γ .
In this case,
ci(a) =
σ2
hiai
β
[1− |Mai(a)|β]+
and we have a player specific unweighted singleton congestion
game.
2) Collocated Users: In this case, all mobiles are situated
close together in a group. Thus hij = hj for all i ∈M, j ∈ N ,
and
ci(a) =
σ2
hai
βi
[1−∑l∈Mai (a) βl]+ .
This yields a player independent weighted singleton conges-
tion game.
3) Collocated BS: Here all BSs are assumed to be situated
close together. Thus hij = hi for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N , and
ci(a) =
σ2
hi
βi
[1−∑l∈Mai (a) βl]+ .
Now, we get a player specific weighted singleton congestion
game.
The following result ensures that MAPC converges in each
of these special cases.
Proposition 3.2: The finite strategic form game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) is an ordinal potential game and
thus admits the FIP in each of the following cases.
1) βi = β for all i ∈ M,
2) hij = hj for all i ∈M, j ∈ N ,
3) hij = hi for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N .
Proof: In each case, we show that the game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) is better response equivalent (Neel [10,
Chapter 5]) to an ordinal potential game (by demonstrating an
ordinal potential function for the latter). This implies that, in
each case, (M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) itself is an ordinal potential
game. It is also finite which implies that the FIP property
holds.
1) The strategic form game (M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) is better
response equivalent to (M,N , (− 1
ci
, i ∈ M)). Also note that
− 1
ci(a)
= −hiai
σ2
[1− |Mai(a)|β]+
β
.
The function V1 : NM → R given by
V1(a) = − 1
σ2β
∏
l∈M
hlal
∏
k∈N

|Mk(a)|∏
t=1
[1− tβ]+


satisfies
V1(j, a−i)− V1(a) = −
(
1
ci(j, a−i)
− 1
ci(a)
) ∏
l∈M\{i}
hlal
×
∏
k∈N

|Mk(a)\{i}|∏
t=1
[1− tβ]+


for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N , a ∈ NM. Thus the game
(M,N , (− 1
ci
, i ∈ M)) is an ordinal potential game with a
potential function V1.2
2) The strategic form game (M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) is better
response equivalent to (M,N , (−βi
ci
, i ∈M)). Also note that
− βi
ci(a)
= −
hai [1−
∑
l∈Mai (a) βl]
+
σ2
.
For the function V2 : NM → R given by
V2(a) = −
∑
i∈M
hai
σ2
βi

[1− ∑
l∈Mai
βl
]+
+ (1− βi)

 ,
V2(j, a−i)− V2(a) = −2
(
βi
ci(j, a−i)
− βi
ci(a)
)
for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N , a ∈ NM. Thus V2 is a potential
function for the game (M,N , (−βi
ci
, i ∈ M)), and so the
latter is an ordinal potential game.
3) The strategic form game (M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) is better
response equivalent to (M,N , (− βi
hici
, i ∈ M)). Also note
that
− βi
hici(a)
= −
[1−∑l∈Mai (a) βl]+
σ2
.
The function V3 : NM → R defined as
V3(a) = −
∑
i∈M
βi[1−
∑
l∈Mai βl]
+
σ2
satisfies
V3(j, a−i)− V3(a) = −2βi
(
βi
hici(j, a−i)
− βi
hici(a)
)
for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N , a ∈ NM. Thus the game
(M,N , (− βi
hici
, i ∈ M)) is an ordinal potential game with
V3 as a potential function.
2This potential function is similar to those proposed in [14] for linear cost
functions, and in [16] for cost functions composed of player-specific constants
and facility-specific functions.
5Now, we focus on the general case. Gairing et al. [14]
show (via a counter-example with 3 players) that player-
specific weighted singleton congestion games with linear cost
functions are not necessarily ordinal potential games, and so,
need not possess FIP. This negative result applies to our game
also, and convergence proofs based on potential functions
cannot be used. However, it follows from [11] that the strategic
form game (M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) admits (i) FIP property if
|N | = 2, (ii) FBRP property if |M| = 2.
Georgiou et al. [15] establish that player-specific weighted
singleton congestion games with 3 players and linear cost
functions possess FBRP property.3 Specifically, they show in
an exhaustive manner that such games do not possess any best
response cycles.4 Their result and proof technique extend to
the game (M,N , (ci, i ∈M)) even though the cost functions
ci are not linear. Thus, the game (M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) can be
shown to possess FBRP if |M| = 3.
In case of more than 3 players, convergence of the best
response dynamics in weighted singleton congestion games
with linear cost functions is an open problem [15], [26].
Georgiou et al. [15] conjecture that such games always admit
at least one NE. Though functions ci are not linear, the game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) is best response equivalent to another
game in which costs are composed of multiplicative player-
specific constants and affine nondecreasing functions. Also,
simulations run on numerous instances of the game suggest
that players’ updates as per the best response strategy always
converge in a finite number of steps. We therefore conjecture
that
Conjecture 3.1: The finite strategic form game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) admits FBRP and thus possesses
at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The FBRP property ensures that MAPC converges in a fi-
nite number of steps (see Section II-A). Consider the following
variants of MAPC.
1) At each t, one mobile is randomly chosen to update its
association. All mobiles have strictly positive probabili-
ties of being chosen.
2) At each t, each mobile i updates its association with
probability ǫi ∈ (0, 1). There is thus a strictly positive
probability that any subset of mobiles may update their
associations simultaneously. As before, all mobiles up-
date their powers based on the new loads. This algorithm
does not require any coordination among mobiles (to
ensure one by one updates), and is thus fully distributed.
The FBRP property of the game (M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)) im-
plies that these two algorithms also converge to a NE with
probability 1 (see Neel [10, Chapter 5]).
D. System Optimality
A system optimal power allocation should bring about the
lowest interference environment. This motivates the following
3On the other hand, Mavronicolas et al. [16] demonstrate a best response
cycle in a game with 3 players and costs composed of additive player-specific
constants and facility-specific nondecreasing functions.
4There does not seem to be any reason why this technique cannot be
extended to more than 3 players; though the number of possibilities in the
exhaustive search may become enormous.
definition of system optimality.
Definition 3.1: For an association profile a, define a system
performance measure C(a) =
∑M
i=1 ci(a) with ci(a) defined
in (1). We define an association profile ao to be system
optimal if it minimizes C(a) over all possible associations
a ∈ ×Mi=1Ai.
Let us now recall the following notion of Pareto effi-
ciency [25, Chapter 5].
Definition 3.2: An association profile a is said to be Pareto
dominated by another association profile a′ if ci(a′) ≤ ci(a)
for all i ∈M with ci(a′) < ci(a) for some i. An association
profile a is said to be Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto
dominated by any other association profile in ×Mi=1Ai.
Clearly any association profile that is system optimal is
also Pareto efficient. Thus, if there is a unique Pareto efficient
association profile, it is also the unique system optimal one.
However, unlike the case of single channel networks, joint
association and power control problems in multichannel net-
works do not in general admit a unique Pareto efficient power
allocation. In particular, when |M| > |N |, there cannot be
unique Pareto efficient power allocation.5 To see this, define
Θi for any mobile i as the set of best match BSs as follows
Θi := argmin
j∈N
σ2γi
hij
The system optimal association profile ao is clearly Pareto
efficient. Next, two cases are possible.
1) For all i, aoi ∈ Θi. Since |M| > |N |, there exist two
mobiles i and l such that aoi = aol .
2) There exists a mobile i such that aoi /∈ Θi.
Consider a mobile i as in Case 1, or as in Case 2. Let a′
be another profile which is system optimal subject to i being
associated with any of its best match BSs and no other mobile
being associated with that BS. It can be easily checked that
a′ is also Pareto efficient.
As the following example illustrates, MAPC may settle at
a Pareto inefficient association profile, and hence may not be
system optimal.
Example 3.1: Consider a network with two BSs, two mo-
biles, and a common SINR requirement γ. The two BSs
operate in disjoint bands. Assume
h12 < h11 <
h12
(1− γ)
and h21 < h22 <
h21
(1− γ) .
The unique Pareto efficient association is (a1 = 1, a2 = 2)
with power allocation ( σ
2
h11
γ, σ
2
h22
γ). However, if we start with
initial association (a1 = 2, a2 = 1), MAPC will not move
forward, because a unilateral switch requires larger power to
meet the target SINR. Neither mobile will switch to the BS
with which it has a better channel. Hence, ( σ
2
h12
γ, σ
2
h21
γ) is a
steady state power vector at which the algorithm settles; it is
Pareto inefficient.
5Though two Pareto efficient power allocations can be identical up to a
permutation, e.g., if two mobiles are indifferent with respect to their SINR
requirements and channel gains to all the BSs.
6In the following we consider special cases, and investigate
whether the proposed algorithm leads to a system optimal
association profile.
1) Collocated Mobiles and Single Class Traffic: Even in
this special case, MAPC may settle at a Pareto inefficient NE
as shown in the following example.
Example 3.2: Consider a 2-cell network with 4 collocated
mobiles and βi = β, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Assume that h1 and h2
satisfy
h1(1− 3β) = h2(1− 2β),
h1(1− 2β) > h2(1− β).
The following facts are easily verified. Both the inequalities
can be met simultaneously. The association (a1 = a2 = a3 =
1, a4 = 2) is a NE from which the algorithm does not move.
This association is Pareto dominated by (a3 = a4 = 1, a1 =
a2 = 2) which is another NE. Thus MAPC may settle at a
Pareto inefficient NE.
Consider now a variant of MAPC in which mobile i = 1+(t
mod M) updates its association at t+ 1 if6
ai(t) /∈ argmin
j∈N

ci(j, a(t)−i), ∑
l∈Mj(j,a(t)−i)
βl

 ,
In this case,
ai(t+ 1) ∈ argmin
j∈N

ci(j, a(t)−i), ∑
l∈Mj(j,a(t)−i)
βl

 ,
In words, a mobiles selects a least loaded BS (counting the
tagged mobile also) among the ones which require transmis-
sion with the least power. We name this variant MAPC∗.
Proposition 3.3: If the strategic form game (M,N , (ci, i ∈
M)) contains no best response cycles, then MAPC∗ converges
in a finite number of steps.
Proof: Suppose ao is the initial association profile. Sup-
pose a1, · · · , ak are successive association profiles generated
by MAPC∗, with a1 possibly the initial association profile
ao. For an association profile a, let m(a) be the congestion
vector with its elements arranged in a decreasing order. The
following two cases are possible.
1) For some j ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}, the deviating mobile
strictly benefits. Then, ak 6= a1 because the game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈M)) does not contain any best response
cycle.
2) The deviating mobiles do not strictly benefit for any j ∈
{1, · · · , k−1}. Then, it must be that m(a1), · · · ,m(ak)
is a lexicographically decreasing sequence. Again, ak 6=
a1.
We thus conclude that iterates generated by MAPC∗ never
contain a cycle. Since there is only a finite number of distinct
association profiles, MAPC∗ must converge in a finite number
of steps.
The FBRP property (Conjecture 3.1) ensures that MAPC∗
converges in a finite number of steps. We now show that
6The minimization is with respect to the lexicographical ordering.
MAPC∗ converges to a Pareto efficient NE in the special case
of collocated mobiles and single class traffic.
Proposition 3.4: For the noncooperative game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)), when hij = hj and βi = β for
all i ∈ M, j ∈ N , the steady states of MAPC∗ are the Pareto
efficient NEs of the game.
Proof: Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 imply that MAPC∗ con-
verges in a finite number of steps in this special case. For
any association profile a, let mj(a) be the number of mobiles
associated with BS j. Let a be a NE, and a′ be another profile
dominating a. We show that the proposed variant of MAPC
does not settle at a.
We first argue that congestion vectors m(a) =
(mN (a), · · · ,mN (a)) and m(a′) cannot be identical. Indeed
if this is the case, a′ is obtained by permuting the mobiles’
associations in a in some way. But then their payoffs undergo
the same permutation, which makes it impossible for all of
them to gain.
We define gj = σ
2
hj
and f(m) = β[1−mβ]+ . Then a mobile
associated with BS j incurs a cost gjf(mj(a)). Further, a
being a NE,
gjf(mj(a)) ≤ gkf(mk(a) + 1)
for all j, k ∈ N . In particular,
mj(a) ≤ mk(a) + 1 if gk ≤ gj , (3a)
and mj(a) < mk(a) + 1 if gk < gj . (3b)
Next, we define
c¯ := max
j∈N :mj(a)>0
gjf(mj(a)),
and N1 := argmax
j∈N :mj(a)>0
gjf(mj(a))
Under a′ none of the mobiles incurs a cost more than c¯. In
particular, those associated with a BS j ∈ N1 under a′ must
have cost less than c¯. This implies mj(a′) ≤ mj(a) for all
j ∈ N1. Now suppose that mj(a′) = mj(a) for all j ∈ N1,
and mk(a′) > mk(a) for a k ∈ N \ N1. Then,
gkf(mk(a
′)) ≥ gkf(mk(a) + 1) ≥ gjf(mj(a))
for any j ∈ N1. The last inequality holds because a is an NE.
Thus we have that
gkf(mk(a
′)) ≥ c¯,
and hence there are more mobiles incurring costs greater
than or equal to c¯ under a′ than under a. This contradicts
the hypothesis that a′ Pareto dominates a. Thus there must
be BSs j ∈ N1, k ∈ N \ N1 with mj(a′) < mj(a) and
mk(a
′) > mk(a) which is same as mk(a′) ≥ mk(a) + 1.
Again, a being an NE,
gkf(mk(a
′)) ≥ c¯.
But the hypothesis that a′ Pareto dominates a implies that
gkf(mk(a
′)) ≤ c¯.
Thus k must belong to the set
N2 := {k ∈ N \ N1 : gkf(mk(a) + 1) = c¯}
7Moreover, mk(a′) = mk(a) + 1.
Now, we claim that there exist BSs j ∈ N1 and k ∈ N2
such that gj < gk. Assume this claim holds. Then,
gkf(mk(a) + 1) = c¯ = gjf(mj(a))
implies that mj(a) > mk(a) + 1. Thus, under the proposed
algorithm, one of the mobiles associated with BS j moves to
BS k, i.e., the algorithm does not settle at a.
We prove the claim via contradiction. Suppose gj ≥ gk for
all j ∈ N1, k ∈ N2. Obtaining a′ from a may involve three
types of load transfers.
1) One mobile moves from a BS j ∈ N1 to a BS k ∈ N2
such that gj = gk. By the definition of N2, such moves
only permute the overall cost profile, and by themselves
cannot lead to a′.
2) One mobile moves from a BS j ∈ N1 to a BS k ∈ N2
such that gj > gk. Then, the cost reduces for mj(a)− 1
mobiles that are still with BS j, but increases to c¯ for
mk(a) > mj(a)−1 mobiles (see (3a)). Such moves also
cannot lead to the association profile a′.
3) n > 1 mobiles move from a BS j ∈ N1 to BSs
k1, . . . , kn ∈ N2 (they have to move to different BSs,
again by the definition of N2). Now, the cost reduces for
mj(a)− n mobiles, but increases to c¯ for
n∑
l=1
mkl(a) ≥ n(mj(a)− 1) > mj(a) − n (see (3b))
mobiles. Such moves also cannot lead to the association
profile a′.
Thus there must be BSs j ∈ N1 and k ∈ N2 such that gj < gk
as claimed. This completes the proof of the proposition.
However, the obtained Pareto efficient association profile
need not be system optimal. This is demonstrated by Exam-
ple 4.2 for the case of a continuum of mobiles.
2) Collocated BSs: Next, we consider the case where the
BSs are collocated, so that hij = hi for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N .
Mobiles may have different target SINR requirements. For any
association profile a, define its support Sa to be the set {j ∈
N : al = j for some l ∈ M}. We say that a has full support
if Sa = N .
Lemma 3.1: In the game (M,N , (ci, i ∈M)), when hij =
hi for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N , any association profile with full
support is Pareto efficient.
Proof: Consider a, an association profile with full sup-
port. Let there be another association profile a′ that dominates
a. Assume that m(a) and m(a′) are the congestion vectors
corresponding to a and a′ respectively. Identify j1, . . . , jN ∈
N and k1, . . . , kN ∈ N such that mj1(a) ≤ · · · ≤ mjN (a)
and mk1(a′) ≤ · · · ≤ mkN (a′). Then we can show by
induction that for every l = 1, . . . , N we must have mkl(a′) ≤
mjl(a). Since a′ dominates a, for a mobile i with ai = j1
and a′i = kr, its costs under a and a′ must satisfy
σ2
hi
βi
[1−mj1(a)]+
≥ σ
2
hi
βi
[1−mkr (a′)]+
.
But mkr (a′) ≥ mk1(a′), implying that
σ2
hi
βi
[1−mj1(a)]+
≥ σ
2
hi
βi
[1−mk1(a′)]+
.
Moreover, our feasibility assumption ensures that both the
sides in the above inequality are finite. Clearly, mk1(a′) ≤
mj1(a). Assume mkl−1(a′) ≤ mjl−1(a). Indeed, if mkl(a′)
were greater than mjl(a), then in order to keep their costs at
most as per a, all mobiles associated with the BSs j1, . . . , jl as
per a must be associated with the BSs k1, . . . , kl−1 in a′. But
by the full support hypothesis mjl(a) > 0, which when put
together with the induction hypothesis yields
∑l
r=1mjr (a) >∑l−1
r=1mkr (a
′). So all of the mobiles associated with BSs
j1, . . . , jl under a cannot be associated with BSs k1, . . . , kl−1
under a′. Thus the induction step is proved. Next, since∑N
l=1 mjl(a) =
∑N
l=1mkl(a
′), we must have mkl(a′) =
mjl(a) for all l = 1, . . . , N . But under this condition, all
mobiles have the same cost under a and a′, contradicting
Pareto domination.
Proposition 3.5: All the Nash equilibria in the game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈ M)), when hij = hi for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N ,
are Pareto efficient.
Proof: Let a∗ be a Nash equilibrium. The following are
the two possible scenarios.
1) a∗ does not have full support: We must have |M| ≤ |N |.
Indeed, if |M| > |N | and a∗ does not have full support,
then there must be mobiles i and l with a∗i = a∗l and
a BS j with Mj(a∗) = ∅. Clearly, mobile i benefits by
moving to BS j. This contradicts the fact that a∗ is a NE.
Next, i 6= l implies a∗i 6= a∗l for the same reason as
explained above. Since all BSs have the same channel
gain to a mobile, a∗ is Pareto efficient.
2) a∗ has full support: Lemma 3.1 implies that a∗ is Pareto
efficient
However, a NE need not be system optimal if traffic is not
of single class or mobiles are not collocated as shown in the
following examples.
Example 3.3: Consider a 2-cell network with collocated
BSs. The 4 mobiles are symmetrically located with respect
to the 2 collocated BSs. Thus hj = h, j = 1, 2. For this
example assume βi = 2β, i = 1, 2, and βi = 3β, i = 3, 4. It
can be seen that (a1 = a2 = 1, a3 = a4 = 2) is a NE which
is Pareto efficient. But its social cost is higher than that of
(a1 = a3 = 1, a2 = a4 = 2) which is another NE.
Example 3.4: Consider a 2-cell network with 5 mobiles.
The 2 BSs are collocated. Further, hi = ih and βi = β, i =
1, 2, 3, 4 where 14 < β <
1
3 . Any profile in which two mobiles
associate with one BS, and the remaining three with another
is a NE. On the other hand, (a1 = a2 = 1, a3 = a4 = a5 = 2)
and (a1 = a2 = 2, a3 = a4 = a5 = 1) are the only socially
optimal NEs.
3) Collocated Mobiles, Symmetrically Placed BSs, and Sin-
gle Class Traffic: In the special case when all the mobiles
are collocated and all the BSs are symmetrically placed with
respect to the collocated mobiles, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.6: All the NEs in the game (M,N , (ci, i ∈
M)), with hij = h for all i ∈M, j ∈ N , are system optimal.
Proof: The mobiles as well as BSs are indistinguishable
in this game. At a NE, let mj be the number of mobiles
8associated with BS j. We first prove that at any NE, the vector
of mobiles’ costs is unique up to permutations. To prove this,
it suffices to prove that the vector m = (mj , j ∈ N ) for a NE
is unique up to permutations. As m yields a NE, the following
must hold for all j, k ∈ N :
σ2
h
β
1−mjβ ≤
σ2
h
β
1−mkβ − β
or mj ≤ mk + 1. (4)
Define n = ⌊M
N
⌋ and l = M − nN . From (4) we see that m
given by mj = n+ 1, j = 1, . . . , l,mj = n, j = l + 1, . . . , N
characterizes one of the NEs; other NEs are permutations of
this vector, and m is unique up to permutations. We now show
that m is a system optimal congestion vector, and the system
optimality of all other NEs follows. To do this observe that
C(a) =
σ2
h
∑
i∈M
β
1−maiβ
=
σ2
h
∑
j∈N
mjβ
1−mjβ
is a Schur-convex function in (m1, . . . ,mN ) because x1−x is
a convex function. This implies that the minimum value is
attained at a vector which is as close to uniform as possible,
i.e., a vector that is majorized by any other vector (Marshall
& Olkin [27]).7 All such vectors are permutations of m (Al-
ternatively, if there exist BSs j and k such that mj ≥ mk+2,
moving a mobile from BS j to BS k results in a strictly lower
cost). This concludes the proof.
IV. CONTINUUM OF MOBILES
In this section, we consider a nonatomic version of the
system in Section III-A. Such a model is of interest for
two reasons. First, for many of the fixed QoS traffic classes
(e.g., voice), the target SINR requirements in CDMA cellular
systems are very small. In a typical IS 95 CDMA system with
system bandwidth 1.25 MHz, chip rate 1.2288 Mcps, data rate
9.6 Kbps, and target Eb
N0
= 6 dB, the target SINR turns out to
be -15 dB, i.e., 132 (Kumar et al. [25, Chapter 5]). If we assume
that at any time the number of mobiles associated with a BS
is large, it is reasonable to say that an incoming mobile or
an outgoing mobile has a negligible effect on the congestion.
Secondly, we have seen that our proposed algorithm may end
up with inefficient associations. There is extensive work on
toll mechanisms that induce system optimality in networks
with a continuum of users. The analysis of toll-mechanisms (or
pricing) on a multichannel multicell network with a continuum
of mobiles can be expected to shed light on the existence and
properties of pricing mechanisms for networks with discrete
mobiles.
A. System Model
Let M = ∪Ll=1Ml be an infinite set of L = {1, . . . , L}
classes of nonatomic mobiles. By nonatomic mobiles, we
mean that the effect of a single mobile at a BS is infinitesimal.
The population of class l mobiles has “mass” Ml. All the
7The condition hij = hi for all j ∈ N is used to deduce that NE profiles
are majorized by any non NE profile; the condition hij = hj for all i ∈M
is used to deduce Schur-convexity of C(a).
mobiles in a class are collocated and require equal minimum
SINR. In particular, all such mobiles have same power gains
to any of the BSs (gains from a mobile to different BSs can be
different). Assume N to be the finite set of BSs. As before, σ
denotes the common standard deviation of receiver noise at all
BSs. Let γl be the common minimum required SINR density
for class l mobiles, and hlj be the power gain between a class
l mobile and BS j. An association profile a is a measurable
function a :M→N . Any association a leads to a congestion
profile m(a) = (mlj(a), l ∈ L, j ∈ N ), mlj(a) being the
mass of class l mobiles associated with BS j. Let M∗ denote
the set of all such congestion profiles.
Under an association profile a and a power density allo-
cation p : M → R+, the SINR density for x ∈ Ml, l ∈ L
is
hla(x)p(x)∑L
l=1
∫
Ml 1a(x, z)hla(z)p(z)dz + σ
2
,
where 1a(x, z) =
{
1, if a(x) = a(z)
0, otherwise
Our definition of a “class” makes all the mobiles in a class
alike, and so, congestion profiles are sufficient to characterize
the system. In the sequel, we just use mlj for mlj(a) for
convenience. The dependence on a is understood.
Consider again the subproblem of power control with a fixed
congestion profile m. The following result is analogous to
Proposition 3.1, and is shown in Appendix A.
Proposition 4.1: 1) The power control subproblem of BS
j is feasible iff
∑
l∈Lmljγl < 1.
2) If the power control subproblem of BS j is feasible, there
exists a unique Pareto efficient power density p given by
p(x) =
σ2
hlj
γl
1−∑l∈Lmljγl ,
∀x ∈ Ml such that a(x) = j, l ∈ L, where a is the
underlying association profile.
An evolutionary dynamics can be proposed to address the
combined association and power control problem. To this end,
we define functions clj : M∗ → R+, where clj(m) denotes
the minimum power density for class l mobiles associated with
BS j under congestion profile m, as
clj(m) =
γlσ
2
hlj [1−
∑
l∈Lmljγl]+
.
For notational convenience, define
glj =
γlσ
2
hlj
,
mj =
L∑
l=1
γlmlj , ∀j ∈ N
and c(z) =
{
1
1−z , if z < 1
∞, if z ≥ 1.
We then have
clj(m) = gljc(mj). (5)
Again we assume that the system is feasible, i.e., there exists
a feasible assignment, as done in Section III-B. This boils
9down to assuming
∑
l∈L γlMl < N in the case of nonatomic
mobiles. Now, structures of the cost functions allow us to
restrict attention to the region where mj < 1, ∀j ∈ N ; if
mj ≥ 1 for a j ∈ N , all the mobiles associated with j incur
infinite cost.
B. A Congestion Game Formulation
We model the problem as a nonatomic congestion game.
The continuum of mobiles constitute the population, and N
denotes the common action set for players of all the classes.
Class l players are accompanied by cost functions clj(m), j ∈
N . In the following, we refer to it as the game (M,N , (clj , l ∈
L, j ∈ N )).
Proposition 4.2: The nonatomic game (M,N , (clj , l ∈
L, j ∈ N )) is a potential game. Furthermore, it admits at
least one NE, and the set of NEs coincides with the set of
minimizers of the potential function.
Proof: In the region {m : mj < 1, ∀j ∈ N}, the function
V :M∗ → R ∪ {+∞} defined as
V (m) :=
∑
j∈N
(∑
l∈L
γlmlj log glj +
∫ mj
0
log c(x)dx
)
, (6)
is a C1 function with
∂V (m)
∂mlj
= γl log glj + γl log c(mj) = γl log clj(m)
for all l ∈ L, j ∈ N ,m ∈ M∗. Thus the nonatomic game
(M,N , (γl log clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )) is a potential game with
V (m) as a potential function (see Definition 2.5). Note that
the strategic form game (M,N , (clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )) is better
response equivalent to (M,N , (γl log clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )).
Thus the former is also a potential game with the same
potential function V (m).
Now consider the following optimization problem
Minimize V (m)
subject to
∑
j∈N
mlj = Ml, l ∈ L (7a)
mlj ≥ 0, l ∈ L, j ∈ N . (7b)
All the conditions are self-explanatory. Observe that
∂2V (m)
∂mikmlj
=
{
γiγlc(mj) if k = j,
0 otherwise.
Thus, with an appropriate ordering of the components of m,
the hessian of V (m) is given by
∇2V (m) =


c(m1)D 0 . . . 0
0 c(m2)D . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . c(mN )D

 ,
where
D := ΓΓT , (8a)
and Γ := [γ1, · · · , γL]T . (8b)
Clearly, D, and hence ∇2V (m) is a positive semi-definite
matrix. Thus, V (m) is a convex function of m. Since we
are minimizing a convex objective function subject to linear
constraints, there exists at least one minimizer, and all minima
are global minima. Also, Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions
are necessary and sufficient [28, Section 5.5.3]. Combining
this with the fact that NEs are the profiles which satisfy the
Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a minimizer of the
potential function (see Section II-B), we see that the set of NEs
coincides with the set of minimizers of the potential function.
Remark 4.1: The assertion in the above proposition does
not hold for general population games. While all local max-
imizers of potential function are equilibria, not all equilibria
maximize potential (even locally) in general [17, Section 3].
This is unlike finite player potential games where only equi-
libria are the local maximizers of potential functions.
Furthermore, NEs have the following property (see [29,
Proposition 3.3]).
Proposition 4.3: The congestion at a BS is constant across
all the NEs of the game (M,N , (clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )).
Consequently, the cost density for a class is also constant
across all the NEs.
Remark 4.2: At NEs, the congestions (at BSs) by class,
mlj , are not unique because the objective function (6) is not
strictly convex with respect to this set of variables.
C. System Optimality
Analogous to the definition in Section III-D, we define the
system performance measure
C(m) :=
∑
j∈N
L∑
l=1
mljgljc(mj). (9)
A congestion profile m∗ ∈ M∗ is said to be system optimal
if it minimizes C(m) over all possible profiles m ∈ M∗.
In contrast with the discrete mobiles case where equilibria
need not be Pareto efficient (see Example 3.1), we have the
following result for the nonatomic case.
Proposition 4.4: All NEs of the nonatomic game
(M,N , (clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )) are Pareto efficient.
Proof: Let m be a NE congestion profile. Under a NE,
the cost densities for the mobiles of the same class are equal,
irrespective of their associations (see Remark 2.2). Thus, it is
sufficient to prove that there does not exist another congestion
profile m′ such that for every class l, and for all BSs j, k,
with mlj > 0,m′lk > 0,
clk(m
′) ≤ clj(m), (10)
and strict inequality holds for some such l, j and k. Assume
that such an m′ exists. Then,
glkc(m
′
k) < gljc(mj) ≤ glkc(mk)
where the last inequality follows because m is a NE and mlj >
0. This yields m′k < mk. This further implies that there is a
BS s such that m′s > ms, and a class t such that m′ts > mts.
By the strictly increasing property of c, we have
gtsc(m
′
s) > gtsc(ms) ≥ gtrc(mr)
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for a BS r such that mtr > 0. Such a BS of course exists
and the latter inequality follows because m is a NE. The two
inequalities imply cts(m′) > ctr(m), and so the tuple t, r, s
violates (10). Thus the assumption that m′ Pareto dominates
m is incorrect. This completes the proof.
We show that the NEs are system optimal if all the mobiles
are collocated, and all the BSs are symmetrically placed
around them.
Proposition 4.5: All NEs in the nonatomic game
(M,N , (clj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )), with hlj = h for all
l ∈ L, j ∈ N , are system optimal.
Proof: In the case of collocated base stations
C(m) =
σ2
h
∑
j∈N
L∑
l=1
γlmljc(mj)
=
σ2
h
∑
j∈N
mjc(mj)
For the reason described earlier, we restrict attention to the
region where mj < 1, ∀j ∈ N . In this region,
d
dmj
mjc(mj) =
1
(1−mj)2 ,
and so mjc(mj) is a convex function of mj . Thus C(m) is a
Schur-convex function of (mj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N), and is minimized
at any m∗ with
m∗j =
1
N
∑
l∈L
γlMl
for all j ∈ N . When hlj = h for all l ∈ L, j ∈ N , any
congestion profile with equal congestion at all the BSs is a
NE. Thus, the system optimal profile m∗ is a NE. Since all
the NEs incur equal cost (see Proposition 4.3), all NEs are
system optimal.
However, NEs need not be system optimal if BSs are not
collocated, or mobile are not collocated. We illustrate these
facts through the following examples.
Example 4.1: Consider an infinite set M of nonatomic
mobiles belonging to two classes; class 1 and class 2 mobiles
have masses M1 and 3M1 respectively. Assume common
minimum SINR density requirement γ, and let 3M1γ < 1.
Let there be two collocated BSs. Let the power gain between
a class l mobile and a BS be hl, h1 < h23 . A congestion profile
is a NE if and only if it assigns equal load to both the BSs.
Thus, the total cost incurred at NE
C∗ =
γM1σ
2
h1(1 − 2γM1) +
3γM1σ
2
h2(1 − 2γM1) .
Next, consider a profile in which class 1 mobiles associate
with BS 1 and class 2 mobiles associate with BS 2. The cost
incurred now is
C =
γM1σ
2
h1(1− γM1) +
3γM1σ
2
h2(1− 3γM1) .
It can be easily checked that C < C∗ if
M1 <
1
γ
h2/3− h1
h2 − h1 .
Example 4.2: Consider an infinite set M of nonatomic
mobiles all belonging to same class; M := |M|. Assume com-
mon minimum SINR density requirement γ, and let Mγ < 1.
Let there be two BSs with hj the gain to BS j, j = 1, 2. An
NE congestion profile (α∗M, (1− α∗)M) is given as
1) if h1
h2
≤ (1 −Mγ), α∗ = 0,
2) if h2
h1
≤ (1 −Mγ), α∗ = 1,
3) otherwise, α∗ satisfies
γσ2
h1(1− α∗γM) =
γσ2
h2(1− (1 − α∗)γM)
i.e., 1− α
∗γM
1− (1− α∗)γM =
h2
h1
. (11)
On the other hand, a congestion profile (αoM, (1 − αoM)
will be system optimal if and only if αo solves the following
optimization problem:
Minimize αγMσ
2
h1(1− αγM) +
(1− α)γMσ2
h2(1 − (1− α)γM) (12)
subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
This is a convex optimization problem, and it is straightfor-
ward to show that
1) if
√
h1
h2
≤ (1−Mγ), αo = 0,
2) if
√
h2
h1
≤ (1−Mγ), αo = 1,
3) otherwise, αo satisfies
1− αoγM
1− (1 − αo)γM =
√
h2
h1
(13)
Hence, if min{h1
h2
, h2
h1
} > 1−Mγ, then min{
√
h1
h2
,
√
h2
h1
} >
1−Mγ, and α∗ and αo must satisfy (11) and (13) respectively.
In such a case, the NE will be system optimal if and only if
h1 = h2.
Remark 4.3: Sandholm [17] shows that if the cost function
for each mobile is a homogeneous function of a certain degree,
then all NEs are system optimal. Note that in Example 4.2,
NEs are not system optimal unless h1 = h2. We remark that
the system optimality for the latter case does not follow from
Sandholm [17] because the cost functions are not homoge-
neous functions.
V. PRICING FOR SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
A. Continuum of Mobiles
In this section, we show that there is a toll mechanism that
can induce system optimal associations and power allocations
in a cellular network with multiple classes of mobiles. We also
show that the mechanism can be employed in a distributed
fashion.
Define
c′(z) :=
{
d
dz
c(z) = 1(1−z)2 , if z < 1
∞, if z ≥ 1
Consider a congestion profile m = (mlj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N ). We
propose that a class l mobile joining BS j be levied a toll
tlj(m) = γl
L∑
i=1
mijgijc
′(mj). (14)
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Now, define c¯lj(·) = clj(·) + tlj(·), ∀l ∈ L, j ∈ N , and
consider the nonatomic game (M,N , (c¯lj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )).
Players may incur different power costs (clj(·)) in different
NEs of this game. Therefore, one has to distinguish between
the following two cases (see Fotakis & Spirakis [30]).
1) A toll mechanism is said to weakly enforce system
optimality if some NE of the game with tolls is an optimal
profile.
2) It is said to strongly enforce system optimality if all the
NEs of the game with tolls are optimal profiles.
We show that tolls tlj(·) weakly enforce system optimality in
all cases and strongly enforce it in a special setting.
Proposition 5.1: The nonatomic game (M,N , (c¯lj , l ∈
L, j ∈ N )) is a potential game. Furthermore, a congestion
profile m is system optimal only if it is a NE of this game.
Proof: Recall the system performance measure C(m)
defined in (9). Observe that
∂C(m)
∂mlj
= c¯lj(m)
for all l ∈ L, j ∈ N , and m in {m : mj < 1, ∀j ∈ N}. Thus
the nonatomic game (M,N , (c¯lj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )) is a potential
game with C(m) as a potential function (see Definition 2.5).
Next, observe that system optimal associations and powers
are solutions of the following nonlinear optimization problem:
Minimize C(m)
subject to Conditions (7a) - (7b).
Since all the constraints are linear, any optimizing congestion
profile of C(m) necessarily satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
first order conditions [28, Chapter 5]. But, any congestion
profile satisfying these conditions is a NE of the game
(M,N , (c¯lj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )). Thus, any system optimal
congestion profile is also a NE of this game.
If all the mobiles are collocated, the proposed tolls strongly
enforce system optimality.
Proposition 5.2: All NEs in the nonatomic game
(M,N , (c¯lj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )), with hlj = hj for all
l ∈ L, j ∈ N , are system optimal.
Proof: It suffices to show that C(m) is a convex function
if hlj = hj for all l ∈ L, j ∈ N . Then, any congestion profile
satisfying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (i.e., any NE) is
system optimal.
If hlj = hj for all l ∈ L, j ∈ N ,
C(m) =
∑
j∈N
mjc(mj)σ
2
hj
.
Using the observation c(x) + xc′(x) = c′(x), it is easy to see
that
∂2C(m)
∂mikmlj
=
{
γiγlc
′′(mj)σ
2
hj
if k = j,
0 otherwise,
and
∇2C(m) =


c′′(m1)σ
2
h1
D 0 . . . 0
0 c
′′(m2)σ
2
h2
D . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . c
′′(mN )σ
2
hN
D

 ,
with D given by (8a)-(8b). It is now obvious that ∇2C(m)
is a positive semi-definite matrix, and so C(m) is a convex
function of m.
However, the tolls tlj(m) may fail to strongly enforce a
system optimal congestion profile even if all the BSs collo-
cated, the mobiles require a constant SINR density γ, but they
are not collocated. To see this, consider the congestion profile
m∗ with
m∗lj =
Ml
N
∀l ∈ L, j ∈ N .
It can be easily checked that, for all l ∈ L,
c¯lj(m
∗) =
γσ2
hl
c
(
γM
N
)
+
L∑
i=1
γ2σ2
hi
Mi
N
c′
(
γM
N
)
,
which is independent of j ∈ N . Thus m∗ is a NE of the game
(M,N , (c¯lj , l ∈ L, j ∈ N )). But m∗ may not be system
optimal (see Example 4.1).
Remark 5.1: 1) c¯lj = clj + tlj can be interpreted as the
marginal cost due to additional association of class l mobiles to
BS j. The term clj is the power density incurred by these new
mobiles, and tlj is the increase in power consumption densities
of the mobiles already associated with BS j, integrated over all
such mobiles. Economists call them “private cost” and “social
cost”, respectively. Selfish mobiles do not care for the social
cost, while the social optimality criterion accounts for this
marginal externality [31].
2) The cost functions for various classes have a certain
structure in the settings of interest to us. Mobile classes that
consider a BS pay tolls proportional to their required SINR
densities. In particular, tolls are uniform across all the mobile
classes that have equal SINR requirements. This is special to
our setting; usually one does not see uniform tolls in the case
of multiclass networks (see Dafermos [20], Smith [21]).
This toll mechanism can be implemented in a distributed
fashion. All the BSs broadcast the tolls (normalized by SINR
densities) along with their aggregate congestions as before.8
All mobiles need to know their scaled gains hlj
σ2
to each BS
j ∈ N . A mobile then makes a choice taking both power
density and toll into account.
B. Discrete Mobiles
Pricing mechanisms for networks with discrete mobiles
are relatively difficult to design and analyze (Fotakis & Spi-
rakis [30]). Again, we propose a toll mechanism that weakly
enforces system optimality in all cases and strongly enforces
it in a special setting. The mechanism is motivated by the toll
mechanism for the nonatomic case (Theorem 5.1).
Consider the network model of Section III-A and an asso-
ciation profile a′. Let mobile i evaluate BS j for association.
Define a = (j, a′−i). Analogous to the nonatomic case, define
8Normalized tolls tlj
γl
are uniform across all mobile classes that consider
a BS. A mobile can recover the exact toll from the normalized value.
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“private” and “social” costs as
ci(a) =
σ2
hij
βi
[1−∑k∈Mj(a) βk]+ ,
and ti(a) =
∑
l∈Mj(a)\{i}
σ2
hlj
(
βl
[1−∑k∈Mj(a) βk]+
− βl
[1 −∑k∈Mj(a)\{i} βk]+
)
, (15)
respectively.9 Clearly, ci(a) is the required power of mobile
i if it joins BS j, while ti(a) is the aggregate increase in
power consumption of all other mobiles associated with BS j.
We propose a toll mechanism with tolls ti : NM → R given
by (15). This yields a new game (M,N , (c¯i, i ∈ M)) with
cost functions for an association profile a given by
c¯i(a) = ci(a) + ti(a)
=
∑
l∈Mai (a)
σ2
hlai
βl
[1 −∑k∈Mai (a) βk]+ −∑
l∈Mai (a)\{i}
σ2
hlai
βl
[1−∑k∈Mai (a)\{i} βk]+ . (16)
Proposition 5.3: The finite strategic form game
(M,N , (c¯i, i ∈ M)) is an ordinal potential game and
thus admits FBRP.
Proof: For the game (M,N , (c¯i, i ∈ M)), the function
V : N |M| → R given by
V (a) =
∑
i∈M
σ2
hiai
βi
[1−∑k∈Mai (a) βk]+
is an ordinal potential function, as can be straightforwardly
checked. Thus (M,N , (c¯i, i ∈ M)) is an ordinal potential
game. Since it is also a finite game, the FBRP property holds.
Note that the potential function V (a) equals the system
performance measure C(a) defined in Section III-D. Hence
an association profile ao that optimizes system performance
is also a (global) minimizer of V (a), and therefore a NE of
the potential game with tolls. So, we see that tolls ti(a) weakly
enforce a system optimal association profile. In general, tolls
do not strongly enforce a system optimal association profile.
For instance reconsider Example 3.1. The association profile
(a1 = 2, a2 = 1) is inefficient, but an NE for the game
(M,N , (c¯i, i ∈M)).
In the following we consider special cases, and investigate
the effect of the proposed tolls.
1) Collocated Mobiles with Single Class Traffic: Let us
consider the special case when all the mobiles are collocated
and have identical minimum SINR requirements. In other
words, hij = hj and βi = β for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N . The
9In (15), when both terms within parentheses are ∞, the expression is taken
to be ∞; we may think of driving β to the true values from below, and the
first term always dominates the second. Same remark holds for other such
expressions also.
potential function for this special case can be written as
V (a) =
∑
j∈N
σ2
hj
|Mj(a)|β
[1− |Mj(a)|β]+
Define gj = σ
2
hj
, f(m) = mβ[1−mβ]+ and mj(a) = |Mj(a)| for
all j ∈ N . Then m(a) = (mj(a), j ∈ N ) denotes the con-
gestion profile under a. Since mobiles are indistinguishable,
any two association profiles that lead to identical congestion
profiles are essentially indifferent from the point of view of
analysis. Thus we talk solely in terms of congestion profiles.
Abusing notation (the argument of V (·) was earlier defined to
be the association profile a), we write
V (m) =
∑
j∈N
gjf(mj).
Since (M,N , (c¯i, i ∈ M)) is a finite potential game, an
association profile m∗ will be a NE if and only if
gjf(m
∗
j ) + gkf(m
∗
k) ≤ gjf(m∗j − 1) + gkf(m∗k + 1) (17)
for all k 6= j, j, k ∈ N . The following proposition shows
that tolls tj(a) strongly enforce a system optimal association
profile in case of collocated mobiles with single class traffic.
Proposition 5.4: All the NEs in the game (M,N , (c¯i, i ∈
M)), with hij = hj and βi = β for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N ,
are system optimal. In other words, the tolls strongly enforce
system optimality.
Proof: Let mo be a system optimal congestion profile,
and m∗ any other profile such that V (m∗) > V (mo). Partition
the set N as N = N0 ∪ N+ ∪N− such that
j ∈ N0 ⇐⇒ m∗j = moj
j ∈ N+ ⇐⇒ m∗j ≥ moj + 1
j ∈ N− ⇐⇒ m∗j ≤ moj − 1
Start with the congestion profile m∗, and move mobiles
from BSs N+ to BSs N− one mobile at a time, so that we
end up with the congestion profile mo. In this process we get
a succession of congestion profiles, each of which satisfies
mj = m
∗
j ∀ j ∈ N0
mj ≤ m∗j ∀ j ∈ N+
mj ≥ m∗j ∀ j ∈ N−
There must exist a pair of successive congestion profiles
m′ and m′′ such that V (m′) > V (m′′), with m′′ possibly
the ultimate congestion profile mo. Let m′′ be obtained from
m′ by the transfer of a mobile from BS j ∈ N+ to a BS
k ∈ N−. We then have
gjf(m
′
j) + gkf(m
′
k) > gjf(m
′
j − 1) + gkf(m′k + 1)
which is same as
gj(f(m
′
j)− f(m′j − 1)) > gk(f(m′k + 1)− f(m′k)). (18)
Recall that f is a convex function and m′j ≤ m∗j ,m′k ≥ m∗k.
Using these in (18), we get
gj(f(m
∗
j )− f(m∗j − 1)) > gk(f(m∗k + 1)− f(m∗k)),
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i.e.,
gjf(m
∗
j ) + gkf(m
∗
k) > gjf(m
∗
j − 1) + gkf(m∗k + 1)
which implies that m∗ is not a NE (see (17)). This completes
the proof.
2) Collocated Mobiles and Symmetrically Placed BSs:
Now we consider another special case when all the mobiles
are collocated and all the BSs are symmetrically placed with
respect to the collocated mobiles. In this case hij = h for all
i ∈M, j ∈ N . We have the following result.
Proposition 5.5: With hij = h for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N , the
NEs in the game (M,N , (c¯i, i ∈M)) coincide with those in
(M,N , (ci, i ∈M)).
Proof: With hij = h for all i ∈ M, j ∈ N ,
ci(a) =
σ2
h
βi
[1−∑l∈Mai (a) βl]+ .
Thus an association profile a is a NE of the game
(M,N , (ci, i ∈M)) if and only if∑
l∈Mai (a)
βl ≤
∑
l∈Mj(a)
βl + βi (19)
for all j ∈ N \ {ai} and i ∈ M. Next,
c¯i(a) =
σ2
h
( ∑
l∈Mai (a) βl
[1−∑l∈Mai (a) βl]+
−
∑
l∈Mai (a) βl − βi
[1−∑l∈Mai (a)\{i} βl]+
)
=
σ2
h
βi
[1−∑l∈Mai (a) βl]+[1−∑l∈Mai (a)\{i} βl]+ .
It can be easily checked that NEs of the game (M,N , (c¯i, i ∈
M)) are also characterized by (19). Hence we get the claim.
Thus tolls may not strongly enforce a system optimal associ-
ation profile in this case (see Example 3.3).
3) Collocated BSs with Single Class Traffic: Even in this
special case tolls tj(a) may fail to strongly enforce a sys-
tem optimal association profile. For an illustration reconsider
Example 3.4. The association profile (a1 = a3 = 1, a2 =
a4 = a5 = 2) is not system optimal, but an NE for the game
(M,N , (c¯i, i ∈M)).
Remark 5.2: 1) While tolls at a BS are equal for all
the mobiles not associated with it and having equal SINR
requirements, they are mobile dependent for all associated
ones (see (15)). This is unlike in nonatomic case where we
saw uniform tolls at a BS for all the mobiles with equal SINR
requirements.
2) The modified algorithm (the one accounting for tolls) can
be implemented in distributed fashion. All the BSs broadcast
quantities toj(a) given by
toj(a) =
∑
l∈Mj(a)
σ2
hlj
βl
[1−∑k∈Mj(a) βk]+
along with their aggregate congestions
∑
k∈Mj(a) βk. All the
mobiles need to know the scaled gains hij
σ2
of their own
channels to all the BSs j ∈ N . Mobiles use these broadcast
information to calculate their powers and tolls, and choose a
BS taking both into account.
Discussion: The proposed pricing technique can be used
to induce a system optimal routing in atomic weighted network
congestion games with arbitrary nondecreasing edge latency
functions [32].10 In this setting, the joint BS association and
power control problems can be viewed as network congestion
games over two-terminal parallel-edge networks: the edges are
identified with BSs, and latencies are identified with minimum
power requirements. It turns out that the proposed tolls weakly
enforce a system optimal routing profile in general network
congestion games. They strongly enforce a system optimal
routing profile if
1) the network is two-terminal series parallel,
2) the users are unweighted (i.e, have identical weights), and
3) the latency functions are standard.11
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the combined association and power control
problem in multichannel multicell cellular networks. We stud-
ied the cases of discrete mobiles and a continuum of mobiles.
We proposed several distributed mechanisms motivated by the
techniques of game theory. We studied the inefficiency of the
distributed algorithm in the case of a continuum of mobiles. It
is an open question whether such inefficiency can be quantified
in the case of discrete mobiles. To mitigate the inefficiency,
we proposed toll mechanisms in both the settings.
Throughout we assumed only one BS per channel. It would
be of interest to extend the work to multiple BSs per channel.
APPENDIX A
NONATOMIC POWER CONTROL
Assume M to be an infinite set of mobiles, and a single BS.
The required SINRs of mobiles are given by the function γ :
M→ R++. Let h :M→ R++ be the gains of mobiles and
let p :M→ R++ be the power allocation. The functions p(x)
and γ(x) are interpreted as power density and target SINR
density, respectively, per unit mass. The feasibility condition
for p can be written as
p(x)h(x)∫
M p(y)h(y)dy + σ
2
≥ γ(x), ∀x ∈ M,
or equivalently,
p(x)h(x) ≥ γ(x)
∫
M
p(y)h(y)dy + γ(x)σ2, ∀x ∈ M.
Integrating the inequalities over the set of all mobiles, we get
the following necessary condition for feasibility.∫
M
p(x)h(x)dx ≥
∫
M
γ(x)dx
∫
M
p(y)h(y)dy
+ σ2
∫
M
γ(x)dx (20)
>
∫
M
γ(x)dx
∫
M
p(y)h(y)dy
10Here, the system cost is weighted sum of the latencies of all the users.
11A latency function c(·) is called standard if mc(m) is convex [31], e.g.,
c(m) = 1
1−m
.
14
where the strict inequality arises because σ2
∫
M γ(x)dx > 0.
Canceling
∫
M p(y)h(y)dy from both sides, we get the neces-
sary condition ∫
M
γ(x)dx < 1. (21)
Assuming (21) holds,
p(x) =
γ(x)σ2
h(x)(1 − ∫M γ(x)dx) (22)
is a feasible power allocation, and so (21) is necessary and
sufficient for feasibility of the power control problem.
The power allocation given by (22) is Pareto efficient. Let
us see why. Suppose q :M→ R++ is another feasible power
allocation such that q(x) ≤ p(x) and strict inequality holds
for a set of mobiles having a positive measure, and so∫
M
q(x)h(x)dx <
∫
M
p(x)h(x)dx,
=
σ2
∫
M γ(x)dx
1− ∫M γ(x)dx
where the equality uses (22). Thus, q violates the necessary
condition ∫
M
q(x)h(x)dx ≥ σ
2
∫
M γ(x)dx
1− ∫M γ(x)dx ,
a rearrangement of (20), and hence cannot be feasible.
In fact p can be shown to be the unique Pareto efficient and
hence the system optimal power allocation.12 Indeed if q is
another feasible power vector which is also Pareto efficient,
the pointwise minimizer of p and q is also feasible and
Pareto dominates p, thus contradicting the fact that p is Pareto
efficient.
APPENDIX B
PRICE OF ANARCHY: CONTINUUM OF MOBILES
Recall that a NE is not necessarily a system optimal con-
gestion profile (see Example 4.2). Coordination ratio [33] or
Price of Anarchy [34] characterizes the inefficiency caused by
the selfish behavior of players; it is the ratio of the cost of the
worst NE and the optimal cost. We observed in Proposition 4.3
that, in the nonatomic case, mobiles incur the same cost at all
the NEs. We can then define price of anarchy as follows.
Definition B.1: Let m be a NE, and mo be a system optimal
congestion profile. Then the price of anarchy is
PoA =
C(m)
C(mo)
.
We restrict our analysis to a single class population. We
assume that all the mobiles have identical minimum required
SINR density γ and identical power gain hj to BS j, j ∈ N .
12The system optimality criterion is to minimize the sum of power con-
sumptions over all the mobiles.
A. Two BSs
First we consider a case with 2 BSs as in Example 4.2.
Let h1 > h2.13 Also, let (α∗M, (1− α∗)M) and (αoM, (1−
αo)M) be the congestion profiles under a NE and a system
optimal association, respectively. Recall from Example 4.2 that
1) if γM ≤ 1−
√
h2
h1
, then α∗ = αo = 1
2) if 1−
√
h2
h1
< γM ≤ 1− h2
h1
, then α∗ = 1, and from (13)
αo =
√
h1 −
√
h2 + γM
√
h2
(
√
h1 +
√
h2)γM
3) if γM > 1− h2
h1
, then from (11)
α∗ =
h1 − h2 + γMh2
(h1 + h2)γM
,
and αo is as above.
C(m) and C(mo) are obtained via substituting α = α∗
and α = αo, respectively, in the objective function (12).
Straightforward calculations give that
PoA(M) =


1 if M ≤ 1−
√
λ
γ
,
λ(2−γM)γM
(1−γM)(2√λ−(1−γM)(1+λ))
if 1−
√
λ
γ
≤M ≤ 1−λ
γ
,
γM(1+λ)
2
√
λ−(1−γM)(1+λ) if M ≥ 1−λγ
where λ := h2
h1
< 1. Further calculations also yield that
PoA(M) is continuous at M = (1−λ)
γ
, and
dPoA(M)
dM
{
≥ 0 if M < 1−λ
γ
,
≤ 0 if M > 1−λ
γ
Thus, the price of anarchy is maximized when M = 1−λ
γ
.
Moreover, the maximum price of anarchy is
1− λ2
2
√
λ− λ(1 + λ) .
Viewing this now as a function of λ ∈ (0, 1], we see that the
maximum price of anarchy decreases with λ. We also observe
that PoA → ∞ as λ → 0, i.e., arbitrarily high PoAs can be
realized in 2 BS networks.
B. N BSs
Again, without any loss of generality, we assume that
h1 ≥ h2 ≥ · · · ≥ hN . We also assume that the population’s
mass is ∆j when it spills over BS j under NE. Clearly,
∆2 ≤ ∆3 ≤ · · · ≤ ∆N . In the case of 2 BSs we proved
that price of anarchy is maximized when the population spills
over BS 2 under NE. In the case of N > 2 BSs also,
simulations suggest that the price of anarchy is maximized
at one of the spill over points {∆j , j = 2, . . . , N}. We have
however not been able to prove this observation. We illustrate
this observation in Figure 1 which shows the price of anarchy
as a function of mass of the population in a network with
5 BSs. For this example γ = 0.01, and the power gains are
chosen independently and uniformly from [0, 1].
13If h1 = h2 equal fraction of population join each of the BSs under the
NE and the system optimal association, and the price of anarchy is 1.
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Fig. 1. PoA vs M : the price of anarchy is maximized at one of the masses
{∆2,∆3,∆4,∆5}.
In the following, we give expression for the price of anarchy
when the total population has mass ∆j , j ≥ 2. Let mk, k < j,
be the mass of the population associated with BS k under NE.
From the definition of NE (see Definition 2.4),
γσ2
hk(1− γmk) =
γσ2
hj
for all k < j.
Thus,
∆j =
∑
k<j
mk =
j − 1
γ
− hjej−1
γ
where ej :=
∑
k≤j
1
hk
for j ≥ 1. The cost at NE
C(m) =
∑
k<j
mk
γσ2
hj
= σ2
(
j − 1
hj
− ej−1
)
.
Next, consider the system optimal congestion profile m∗. It
can be easily checked that m∗k is positive only if k < j′ for a
j < j′ ≤ N . Moreover, it must be the case that√
hk(1− γm∗k) = K for all k < j′,
and
√
hj′ ≤ K,
for some constant K > 0. Recall that
∑
k<j′ m
∗
k = ∆j .
Straightforward calculations yield that
K =
j′ − j + hjej−1
e∗l−1
where e∗j :=
∑
k≤j
1√
hk
for j ≥ 1. Moreover, j′ is the least
index satisfying √
hj′ ≤ j
′ − j + hjej−1
e∗l−1
.
The optimal cost, after substituting the values of m∗k, turns out
to be
C(m∗) =
∑
k<j′
m∗k
γσ2
hk(1 −m∗kγ)
= σ2
(
e∗
2
j′−1
j′ − j + hjej−1 − ej
′−1
)
.
The price of anarchy PoA(∆j) is the ratio C(m)C(m∗) .
Finally, we show that the price of anarchy decreases with
mass for M ≥ ∆N . It can be easily checked that, for M ≥
∆N ,
PoA(M) =
eNMγ
eNMγ − (eNN − e∗2N )
= 1 +
eNN − e∗2N
eNMγ − (eNN − e∗2N )
from which the claim follows. Thus, to obtain a bound on the
price of anarchy, we only focus on M ≤ ∆N . For M ≤ ∆N ,
the load on BS j
mj ≤ 1
γ
(
1− hN
hj
)
under NE. We use this observation in the next section.
C. A Bound on the Price of Anarchy
Now, we derive a sharp bound on the price of anarchy
for single class networks with arbitrary number of BSs,
and gains hj ∈ [hmin, hmax] for all the BSs. We follow
Roughgarden [31, Chapter 3].
In the BS association game, a generic cost function is of
the form
ch(m) :=
σ2
h
γ
1− γM ,
and
C := {ch(·) : h ∈ [hmin, hmax]}
is the class of all feasible cost functions. Observe that the
functions ch(·) and the class C both are standard.14 We define
c¯h(m) :=
d(mch(m)
dm
.
We also assume that the load on a BS with gain hj does not
exceed
θh :=
1
γ
(
1− hmin
h
)
under NE. Thus, we redefine anarchy value for a cost function
ch(·) as15
α(ch) := sup
m≤θh
[λµ+ (1− λ)]−1
where λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies c¯h(λm) = ch(m) and µ :=
ch(λm)
ch(m)
≤ 1. Both λ and µ are functions of m; we do not
show this dependence explicitly. Straightforward calculations
yield that
λ =
1−√1−mγ
mγ
,
µ =
√
1−mγ,
and α(ch) = sup
m≤θh
1
2
[
1− 1
1 +
√
1−mγ
]−1
=
1
2
(
1 +
√
h
hmin
)
.
14A cost function c(·) is called standard if mc(m) is convex. A class C is
standard if it contains a nonzero function and if each c(·) ∈ C is standard [31].
15The original definition [31, Definition 3.3.2] considers supremum over
m ∈ (0,∞).
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The anarchy value for class C is (see [31, Definition 3.3.3])
α(C) = sup
ch∈C
α(ch) =
1
2
(
1 +
√
hmax
hmin
)
It can be easily checked that [31, Theorem 3.3.8] remains
valid with our new definition of anarchy value. Thus, price of
anarchy is bounded by α(C). For any 0 < ǫ ≤ α(C)−1, a price
of anarchy ≥ α(C) − ǫ is realized in a network in which (i)
there is one BS with gain hmax, (ii) there are several BSs with
gain hmin (minimum number depending on ǫ), and (iii) the
population has mass θhmax (see the proof of [31, Lemma 3.4.3]
for details).
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